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Abstract 
We survey the sensor network holes from a cause-effect-solution perspective. We first propose a new taxonomy 
(PLMS) which classifies holes into type groups according to the cause of anomaly. We discuss the effects of holes on 
the sensor network. Finally, we survey the different curative approaches (prevention, detection, repairing, avoidance). 
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1. Introduction 
Sensors are small devices with limited processing and communication capabilities as well as reduced 
battery life. Due to these limitations, deploy-and-ignore approaches are no longer efficient. Indeed, serious 
problems often happen especially when sensors are operating unattended in harsh and remote areas. Holes 
are one challenging example of such defects. They may happen for several reasons, such as shortage of 
, sleep/wakeup cycles, and data traffic congestions in some 
parts of the sensor network. In many cases, due to sudden external events, holes cannot be predicted. They 
may even extend if sensors at their boundaries are solicited with increasing data communication requests.  
The monitoring of holes is a priority because of their negative and sometimes devastating- effects on 
the sensor network. Detecting and repairing holes is possible. However, this is particularly challenging 
since typical sensor networks consist of lightweight, low-capability nodes that are unaware of their 
geographic locations [1]. Due to these limited capabilities, preventing holes from appearing in the sensor 
network or simply trying to bypass them could be a cost effective solution. A more intelligent approach to 
be used for monitoring holes will depend on the hole type and the current context of the sensors and the 
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sensor network. By taking these aspects into consideration and while looking at the causes of holes, the 
overall performance and the lifetime of the sensor network could be improved. In this paper, we survey 
sensor network holes from a Cause-Effect-Solution perspective. Section 2 describes the current 
categorization of holes in sensor networks and then proposes alternative classifications. Section 3 
proposes a new taxonomy of sensor holes which is based on the causes of anomaly and is more 
exhaustive. Section 4 discusses the effects of holes and Section 5 surveys the four curative approaches 
(prevention, detection, repairing, and avoidance) to address the problem of holes in sensor networks. 
2. Categorization of Sensor Network Holes 
To our knowledge, the current literature does not provide a general definition of holes in sensor 
networks. In contrast, it suggests a classification of these holes into types and then defines each type apart.  
Ahmed et al. [2] have described four categories of holes: coverage holes, routing holes, jamming holes, 
and sink/worm holes. Coverage holes usually occur due to the random deployment of sensor nodes [3]. 
According to [4], the existence of such type of holes depends on the required degree of coverage for any 
given application. Indeed, the authors have stated that no coverage hole exists in a given area if every 
point in that area is covered by at least k sensors, where k is the required degree of coverage. According to 
[2], routing holes appear in an area where sensor nodes are not available or the available nodes cannot 
participate in data routing due to malfunctioning, battery depletion, or destruction by an external event.  
In contrast with coverage holes and routing holes, jamming holes, sink holes, and worm holes result 
from unusual behaviors of some objects or sensors within the sensor network. Indeed, jamming holes 
occur when an object to be tracked is equipped with a device capable of jamming the radio frequency 
being used for communication among the sensor nodes. In spite of being able to detect the presence of the 
object, sensors in the vicinity are unable to communicate the information back to the sink [2]. Sink holes 
are caused by malicious nodes which try to attract the traffic within a given sensor network to a 
compromised node. In this attack, an adversary node seduces neighboring sensors by advertising 
optimized routes to forward data to the sink. The malicious node will be selected as the best next-hop by 
sensors in the vicinity and might be recommended to other sensor nodes. In this case, data communication 
will flow more and more through the malicious node that can drop data, selectively forward data based on 
some malicious filtering mechanism, or change data content before relaying it [5]. In addition to 
prevaricating the traffic, sink holes may result in congestion, which could accelerate the energy depletion 
of sensors which are close to the malicious node. Furthermore, like sink holes, worm holes result from 
malicious behaviors of some nodes in the area covered by the sensor network. Indeed, malicious nodes 
located in different parts of the sensor network may create a tunnel among them and start forwarding 
packets received at one part of the network to the other end of the tunnel by using a separate 
communication radio channel [2]. Consequently, nodes located in different parts of the network would 
believe that they are neighbors, resulting in incorrect routing convergence [2]. 
The current literature does not provide a rich categorization of holes in sensor networks. We thus aim 
at investigating the possible categorizations depending on a variety of parameters and characteristics. For 
instance, holes may be categorized with respect to their: 
 Mobility (moving or static): In contrast with static holes caused by anomalies affecting static sensor 
nodes, moving holes may be caused by mobile sensors. Indeed, while moving, sensors may affect the 
topology of the sensor network by creating new connections and breaking others. 
 Life time (persistent or temporary): Persistent holes could not be healed. They often result from 
intrinsic problems to sensors such as energy depletion or extrinsic events such as heavy rain or 
wildfire. Temporary holes (e.g., when nodes sleep), in contrast, are of limited duration and 
disappear/regress as their causes disappear/regress or recovery actions are performed.  
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 Purposes (intentional or unintentional): Unintentional holes occur when, for example, some sensors 
accidentally lack physical capabilities. Intentional holes are created when, for instance, some sensors 
go to sleep as scheduled to save energy. 
 Affected function (functional or nonfunctional): Basically, a sensor node could be requested to 
perform sensing, processing, and/or communicating tasks. We call these tasks functional. In contrast, 
criteria which can be used to judge the performance and the quality of a given node, such as security or 
accuracy, are nonfunctional tasks. (Non)functional holes refer to (non)functional tasks.  
 Cause of anomaly (Physical/semantic/logical/malicious): The most known causes are physical defects 
(routing and coverage holes) and malicious behaviors (jamming and sink/worm holes). Nevertheless, 
we believe that holes may also be caused by semantic or logical defects. We thus propose another 
categorization of WSN holes which includes four types of holes, namely, physical holes, semantic 
holes, logical holes, and malicious holes. More details on this categorization (that we name PLMS) 
will be given in the next section. 
Based on the different categorizations cited above, we propose the following generic definition of a 
anomaly in one or more functional or non-functional tasks in one or more nodes of a specific part of a 
sensor networks. This definition includes all the attributes that we have identified previously and which 
characterize any sensor network hole. The attributes indicating the causes of holes (physical, logical, 
malicious, or semantic) are omitted from the definition for the sake of simplicity and also because they are 
  
3. PLMS: a Cause-based Taxonomy 
The four different categorizations we presented above are related to different aspects of sensor holes. 
As in this paper we study sensor holes from a cause-effect-solution perspective, we will focus on the 
cause-based categorization that we named Physical/Logical/Malicious/Semantic (PLMS) taxonomy.  
Physical holes: They could be classified into five types, namely, processing, energy, coverage, routing, 
and sensing (Fig.1-a). Processing holes may happen if in a given area of interest sensors do not have 
enough physical capabilities to process a given data. This is particularly due to the limited capacities of 
the processor. Sensor nodes which are at the origin of processing holes may cause long delays in the 
overall routing, sensing, or processing activities. In the case of high processing loads, the resources of 
those sensors could be exhausted and thus energy holes could appear. Energy holes resulting from an 
excessive consumption of energy could also be created when nodes, which are sharing common sensing 
tasks, operate simultaneously in a high density network. In Fig.1.a, we give the example of a node A 
which is receiving multiple and different requests. Due to its limited capabilities, node A may exhaust its 
energy before being able to answer all the requests and therefore an energy hole could be created. In 
addition to the routing holes and coverage holes we explained in Section 2, the network could have 
sensing holes. These holes happen due to the limited sensing ranges of some deployed sensors. In Fig.1.a, 
the sensor nodes B, C, and D could be able to cover the area where they are deployed. However, if they 
are asked to collect data from that area, they will fail since their sensing ranges are not enough wide.  
Semantic holes: As the ultimate goal of the sensor network is to provide users with the right data at the 
right time using the right sensors [6], nodes should have certain  (or intelligence) of the 
content of the data they sense, process and forward. Semantic holes are basically related to the content of 
the collected, processed, and routed data as well as to the services provided by the sensor network. 
According to our literature review, the present work emphasizes on issues related to semantics since the 
ultimate goal of the sensor network is to provide users with the right data at the right time using the right 
sensors. To this end, we list four types of semantic holes (Fig.1.b). Sensor type holes could happen when 
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a sensor network including several types of sensors is not able to collect a specific data type from a given 
area. In Fig.1.b, we highlight a sensor type hole where the network is not able to collect data of type 2 and 
type 3 since specialized sensors are not available in the delimited area. When appropriate sensors are 
available, the requested data could be collected if physical impediments do not prevent this operation. 
However, in some circumstances, the collected data may lack accuracy or do not include the requested 
level of details. In such cases, we say that there is an accuracy hole. Moreover, in some configurations, 
the network could be deployed to provide multiple services. In such cases, subsets of sensors could be 
operating simultaneously to provide different services. When a given subset of sensors is not able to 
fulfill its task due to any type of holes, we say that there is a service hole. In such situations, neighboring 
sensors could be available and may help in preventing the disconnection of the service. However, these 
sensors could be assigned to other services and thus their support could be delayed. This happens in a 
collaborative architecture where sensors have to help each other depending on their availability and 
priorities. We illustrate in Fig.1.b an example of service holes where Service 1 is disconnected because of 
the absence of sensors assigned to this service in the delimited area. This hole could be healed in a sensor 
network with a collaborative architecture. However, it will not be healed in a sensor network with a 
competing architecture since sensor nodes are only dedicated to the services to which they are assigned. 
Fig.1.b illustrates two kinds of competition holes. The first competition hole happens when two services 
are using common sensors, in which case delays may result from concurrent processing. The second 
competition hole happens when a service like Service 3 is using exclusively some sensors in a way they 
disconnect another service, which is in the case of Fig.1.b Service 1.  
Logical holes: Several approaches are based on dividing the sensor network into several clusters. 
These clusters are a logical repartition of the network depending on some criteria. We say that there is a 
cluster hole if a sensor is not able to get support from any neighboring peer belonging to the same cluster.  
Malicious holes: In addition to jamming holes, sink holes, and worm holes outlined in Section 2, we 
list trust holes as part of malicious holes (Fig.1.c). These holes may occur when some sensors in the 
the degrees of trust that peers have in each other. To make such estimations, some sensors must be 
endowed with appropriate mechanisms to weight trust based on data contents, communication pathways, 
etc. Depending on the application requirements and/or the expected service, trust holes are delimited 
based on trust weight thresholds. In Fig.1.c, the trust hole is delimited among sensors having 
trustworthiness weights less or equal to 0.6.  
Fig. 1. (a) Physical holes; (b) Semantic holes; (c); Malicious holes. 
4. Effects of Holes on Sensor Network 
    Holes affecting the sensor network activities and performance can be local (they concern the sensor 
causing the hole) or global (they concern the entire network) [7]. This depends on several parameters such 
as the locations of holes, the sensors causing the holes, the current context, and the current requirements. 
In the literature, the effects of holes have been outlined at the level of data acquisition and data routing. 
At the level of data acquisition, destroyed nodes do not carry out their operations appropriately. 
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Consequently, some data on events of interest could not be suitably acquired locally from the areas 
affected by the holes [3]. This local effect may affect the effectiveness of the entire sensor network since 
the missing information would have been used, for example, for self-adaptation purposes. This is the case 
when, for instance, a coverage hole preventing the detection of an intruder in a given location may delay 
the reaction of the network to track that intruder. At the level of data routing, data packets may get stuck 
in some nodes located at the boundaries of coverage holes [8]. In addition to local effects in terms of 
energy depletion, global effects are expected on communication pathways particularly due to congestion. 
In this case, the routing performance of the sensor network may decrease because of potential delays on 
data traffic, loss of data packets, and data collision [3]. Based on our cause-based taxonomy, holes could 
be interrelated. For example, trust holes may result in communication and processing overheads to assess 
the trust weights. These overheads may lead to energy depletion of some sensors. Consequently, energy 
holes may appear. Due to those holes, coverage holes and semantic holes may occur.  
5. Curative Approaches for Sensor Network Holes 
The intensive research works that have addressed the issue of holes in sensor networks have 
particularly focused on four approaches: prevention, detection, repairing, and avoidance. We first survey 
the main contributions of each approach and then associate then to the causes of anomalies (Table 1).  
     Preventing holes: To prohibit the appearance of voids within the sensor network, the common idea is 
to increase the density of the network by deploying redundant sensors, particularly in the threatened areas 
[9]. Shih et al. [10] have proposed a distributed partition avoidance lazy movement (PALM) protocol for 
mobile sensor networks. Since sensor movement is the major source of energy consumption, PALM 
adopts the lazy movement policy for a more effective sensor movement. Huang [11] has proposed a self-
deploying method for wireless sensor network where sensors are modeled as ions, and the links between 
them are treated as ionic bonds. When the number of ionic bonds of a sensor is full, the sensor will expel 
others out of its field. Sensors organize themselves as the hexagonal format to maximize the network's 
coverage area, retain the network connectivity, and prevent from introducing the coverage holes. In [12], 
some guidelines are proposed to prevent the formation of energy holes around sinks by balancing the 
energy expenditure among sensors. This is achieved by selecting proper sizes of coronas around the sink.  
     Detecting holes: Funke [1] has proposed a distributed algorithm, based on the topology of the 
communication graph, which identifies nodes near the boundary of the sensor field as well as near hole  
boundaries by allowing sensors in the network to find all the iso-geodesic distances. Ghrist and 
Muhammad [13] have introduced a technique for detecting coverage holes by means of homology, which 
is an algebraic topological invariant. Corke et al. [7] have proposed two algorithms where holes are 
detected from distance by using traffic information and locally by the neighbors of the failed nodes. 
Wood and Stankovic [3] have described a mapping protocol allowing sensor nodes to detect and surround 
jammers. In the proposed solution, network applications reason about the region as an entity, rather than 
as a collection of broken links and congested nodes. Szczytowski et al. [14] have proposed proactive 
distributed energy profiling algorithms for energy holes. The algorithms search for boundary nodes and 
use them as references to calculate the energy needs of nodes within the hole. Obado et al. [15] have used 
the Hidden Markov Model Viterbi algorithm to detect worm holes in a localized WSN.  
     Repairing holes: The intuitive idea of recharging the batteries of sensor nodes remain difficult to 
impossible, particularly since some sensors could be operating in remote, harsh, and hostile areas. The 
existing approaches proposed for repairing holes in sensor networks had been particularly based on 
maintaining k-connectivity (e.g., [16]) and repositioning the network (e.g., [17; 18]). 
     Avoiding holes: In order to avoid holes during data communication, some solutions (e.g., [19]) have 
used right-hand rule approaches where data packets tend to be routed along the boundaries of holes. Other 
solutions [20; 21] have deployed backpressure approach where data packets are pushed back to upstream 
node and attempt to find another route to destination. Aissani et al. [22] have proposed an approach that 
uses geometric formulas to obtain the forwarding region of a sender node located at 1-hop from the hole.  
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Table 1. Classification of some of the existing works 
 Preventing Detecting Repairing Avoiding 
Physical holes [9;10;19;11;12] [1;3;13;10;17;7;14] [16;17;18] [19;20;21;22] 
Malicious holes [23;24] [5;15;24;25;26;27]  [28;29] 
We notice that most of research efforts on curative approaches concern physical holes. As for 
malicious holes, researchers are mostly active in finding ways to detect malicious holes (especially sink 
holes and black holes). Very few contributions can be found in avoiding, preventing and repairing 
malicious holes. Research works in logical and semantic holes are almost absent. 
6. Conclusion 
   In this paper we focused on the problem of holes in sensor networks. We proposed a taxonomy 
which gives a more exhaustive classification of holes. By surveying a large number of papers, we 
demonstrated that some types of holes (e.g. semantic holes), despite their importance and potential 
contribution, did not get enough attention from researchers.  This could be explained by the fact that 
sensor networks are still in their early stage of development and thus it is not surprising that most of the 
research efforts have addressed technical aspects. Indeed, energy saving, routing, coverage problems, and 
processing concerns had been the main issues that researchers had dealt with in order to make sensor 
networks functional. Security had also been of big concern for researchers, which explains the number of 
works on malicious holes. This is probably due to the critical role of security in the overall well-
functioning of sensor networks. We believe that an extended solution allowing for synchronized efforts to 
prevent, detect, heal, and avoid all types of holes will be necessary in the near future. The implementation 
of such solution requires interdisciplinary qualifications and cross-layer solutions. 
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